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She Jet ision to teach an agreement? The contents of the
agreement? This essay attempts to peel away some layers
t the asumptions surtounding mediation consent. I
begin by discussing the theory of consent and its udiscon-
ect tram medtation practice I then suggest !nd sketch
the structutal dimensions of consent, and, finally, I share
some comparative rcscarch on England's approach to con-
sentJ Ehe histotical connections betwe. en English and
American medititon practice ptovimde souse guidance in
thts inquiry. 1he foundations ot Ametican mediation
practice borrtow from the tradition o English equiy juris-
dictiotn, an alternative dispute resolution system that
developed to soften the harshness of common law rules.
Likewise, mediation de eloped in the United States as an
alternative to court adjudication based on the rule of law.
boday, Engand's approach to mediation remains sone-
w.hat more faithfful to thc original understanding of medi-
aition as a voluntary pmocess.
Why Consent Matters
The legitimacy of tmediation depends in large measure
upon coirsensual decision making by disputing parties.
Consent promotes fairness and enhances human dignity,
ornd it is linked to durability and sustainability in negoti-
ated agreements.' Freiuently, the fatal flaw in agreements
that ultimately utavel is the absence ot authentic consent.
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tvfeIia1tion cok .sni as a stand--a1one concept is "irtor-
pNusI Conisnt to what? iT w on? When? ha an effort to
S t hs t'ct ept soot flesh nd meaning, conrceptualize
consent Is havig I two-part structure: tront-end or
entry -lvel consent, which is required for participation in
the mrediation process, and back-end or outcome consent
that supports an authentic agreement.
In the United States, we generally have no problem
dispensing with front-end consent in mediation. Many
statutes require "good faith" participation, mandatory
mtediation programs flourish, and judges impose sanctions
when parties refuse to mediate when required to do so by
court rule or statute. Sore literature suggests that people
who are required to participate in mediation report high
levels of satisfaction with the process.'
I e Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators define
Icdiation as a process that emphasizes voluntary decision
niaking and honors self-determination as its controlling
prilciple? Thus, Americans are quite comfortable requir-
ing back-end consent in mediation, insisting that parties
voluntarily consent to the outcome and that no coercion
take place during the mediation process.
What Is the Problem?
Mediation, once considered an alternative to the court
adjudication of disputes, is now generating its own set of
disputes as evidenced by the volume of litigation related
to consent practices. A review of developing mediation
cse law shows that most cases relate to issues dealing
with mandates to mediate, good faith requirements, and
challenges to the enforceability of mediated agreements.'
These are all issues that relate to consent. And, for the
(It part, these corsent cases are not brought by pro se
itiganits wihotn we might assume would be the most vul-
nerabiet parties in mediation. Rather, they are brought by
partties who were represented by attorneys. Some of the
cases involve clairos aganst attorneys and mediators and
not just opposing parties.
In addition to the fact that the volume of consent
cases is growing, the outcome of these cases is problemat-
ic. The majority of parties who challenge the enforceabil-
ity of mediated agreements are not successfulis This is true
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even for challenges based on defenses such as duress and
coercion. Such results have led some scholars to suggest
that, in the case of agreements made in mediation, there
should be a cooling-off period before agreements become
final so that parties have time to reflect.
England's Experience with Mediation Consent
Beginning in the rid-1990s, England underwent a major
overhaul of its litigation procedures under the leadership of
Lord Woolf, one of its leading senior judges. Lord Woolf
conducted an extensive study of the civil justice system and
issued a report entitled "Access to justice."" As a result of
the report, the longstanding Rules of the Supreme Court of
England were replaced by a new set of Civil Procedure
Rules (CPR) that required courts to encourage parties to use
ADR processes where appropriate." In a series of cases
beginning with Cowl v. Plymouth City Council," English
courts strongly encouraged parties to use ADR--a term
used almost interchangeably with "mediation."
While costs have been awarded in some
cases for parties refusals to mediate, this
is by no means an inevitable result.
Despite its newfound appeal in the courts, ADR raised
critical questions about consent. Could parties be required
to participate in mediation? What consequences would
occur if they refused? For several years, the courts grappled
with these questions, going back and forth on the necessity
of front-end consent." Finally, in Halsey v. Milton Keyncs
General NHS Trust, " the Court of Appeal resolved the
uncertainty in favor of requiring front-end consent, Parties
could not be compelled to participate in mediation for two
reasons. First, such compulsion would interfere with a lirt-
gant's right of access to the courts, which is guaranteed by
Article 6 of the European Convention on 1 luman Rights.
The court believed that "to oblige truly unwilling parties to
refer their disputes to mediation would be to impose an
unacceptable obstruction on their right of access to the
court." The second reason for rejecting mandatory media-
tion was a practical one. Requiring unwilling parties to
mediate would achieve nothing, but it could have negatve
effects, including adding to the costs to be borne nx the
parties, possibly postponing the time when the cour deter-
mines the dispute, and possibly damagigm the perceived
effectiveness oI the mediation.
But the Halsey courts r qiereenr of front-en1d consent
for mediation did not autonaticallv het parties off the hooL.
The court held that there s',ioid be cost consequences fotr
parties who ri;e :iotably refused Lo consent to reliation.
As a rest, evo-n successf partie-s Would have to pay costs
if they unrcasonal'y re fused to c' ,ntenr to roediatio. 1his
approach is at odds with the traditional Inrglish rule that
the unsuecssfut pary pays costs he coucrt offered six
none,, hatsive gilide lines to denr mine the reasonableness
of a refusal to mediate: (1) the narure of the dispute; (2) the
merits of tie case; ( 1) the extent to which other settlement
methods have been atteipted; (4) wiether ie costs of the
APR would be disproportiona ely high; (5) wvhetlser ary
delay in setting up and attending the ADIR would base
been prejudicial; and (6) 'vhether the miediation had a rea-
sonable prospect of success.
Mo st post-Halsey mediation consent cases deal with
thse reasonableness of refusals to mediate or negotiate.
While costs hav, been as. arded in some
case s forr parties' rfusals to mediate, this is
by no loean, an inevitable result. in sever-
al cases, corts have found that it was not
S unreasonable for parties to withhold con-
sent o mrediation or even to delay in going
to nediation. For example, in Hickman v.
A " BKke Lopthorn," a claimant who had suf-
le c serious head injuries in a traffic
ttaccident brought itian -action against
his solicitors and counsel fo negli-
. gence in adsising hiim to sett!e the
arcident cahn for too low ars
ainount. Judgment xas renlered
in favor of the Claimant, and ia--
bility was apportioned as one-
third to the first defendant solicitors and two-thirds to the
second defendant barrister. The first defendants argued
that the second defendant should pay all costs after a
specific date because of its unreasonable attitude in refus-
ing io neg otiate and imediate. Finding no unrcasorable-
ness on the part of the second defendant, the court noted
that the second defendanti's viex of Isie case had been
formed after a review of the case by experienced solicitors
and counsel.
Was it unreasonable in the Jigh of that estimation to retuse
uiediatirot and to refiris iio see what could Ie achieved by
nti1 Ittion?; It is ippairnt thii the second defendan i'
insriters w e not preparedI to take a "coiniiercial." view like
te first dfesndants: they wvee not pre pared to pay inert
than they though t the claim xas, onh hecause, if costs
were taken into acotrInt it ouid sacve thor money I co-
sider ths seas -, legitirart' sc ance kecause, -ss I have sated,
othenvisc the tlerunat o-a cos-t ccaeqtte in be used to
ecXMct .rie th as .5 cfaino in worth.
1Lik ise, in Cha rtet .Yap,'_ an employment case
.'ln cs~Iunlair t 'i Mssal, the court found that the success-
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ful petitioner should not be deprived of his costs for failing
to mediate because the respondent had not demonstrated a
genuine interest in mediation. Although the respondent
made repeated suggestions that the parties mediate, it
offered no specific proposals for mediators or provider
organizations. The court found that this behavior was
inconsistent and uncertain, not a "serious engagement in
the process of mediation."
Few post-Halsey cases have challenged the enforceabil-
ity of mediated agreements.
Concluding Reflections
This brief comparative analysis of the United States and
English approaches to mediation consent raises policy ques-
tions about the merits of mandatory mediation. Is England
on a better course by requiring consent at the front end of
mediation? Will mediation be stronger in the long run
when it has a consensual foundation? Arguably, the use of
cost sanctions in England's mediation regime makes it close
to a mandatory mediation system. For some litigants, par-
ticipating in mediation will be potentially less costly than
arguing that it was not unreasonable to refuse mediation.
But despite the mandatory gloss, mediation is still a con-
sensual process in England, both in terms of the front end
and the back end. Leaving aside the differences in proce-
dural systems, whether the English model would work in
the United States depends in part on how comfortable we
are with our system "as is, " as well as the long-term effects
of U.S. consent litigation, and English reasonableness liti-
gation, on the integrity of the mediation process.
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From the Chair
(continued from page 2)
prehearing discovery; and stipulating to facts to reduce
the hearing time. Yes, in arbitration the parties must pay
an arbitrator rather than using a "free" judge provided by
the court system, but in a litigated commercial arbitration
hearing where the parties are represented by counsel, the
arbitrator is generally the lowest-paid professional in the
hearing room, and arbitrator fees should not present a
cost impediment to choosing to arbitrate.
Finally, if there is concern about arbitrator bias, partic-
ularly because the grounds for vacatur of an arbitration
award are quite limited, lawyers and parties should care-
fully select the agreed-upon arbitrator. Arbitrators must
comply with the disclosure requirements of the applicable
arbitration law, and arbitrators serving on panels of rep-
utable arbitration organizations must comply with the
disclosure guidelines in the Code of Ethics for Arbitrators
in Commercial Disputes. Nonetheless, it is incumbent upon
the participants in an arbitration to investigate carefully the
background, qualifications, and demonstrated fairness of
candidates to serve as arbitrator before the arbitrator is
appointed. If there is any question of actual or apparent
bias, the factual basis for the question should be called to
the attention of the arbitral organization or the arbitrator
before or during the arbitration so that the arbitrator can
recuse herself or be removed. Allegations of bias after an
adverse award should be viewed with skepticism.
There are considerable benefits of choosing arbitration
as an alternative to the courts for resolution of civil dis-
putes. Parties electing arbitration can get the fair and
cost-effective process they need, even if they can't always
get the outcome they want. *
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